Curriculum·G601 Stablecoin Mechanics and Issuer Risk·about 32 min

Reserves, redemption, and the run

By the end of this lesson you can

  • →Explain that redemption in a run is met from liquid reserves, not from total reserves
  • →Describe how USDR held its backing in illiquid real estate and depegged when redemptions surged
  • →Compute why the liquid tranche, not the headline reserve figure, sets how big a run a coin survives
  • →Judge a stablecoin's reserves by their liquidity and redeemability, not their total value

Graduate · enrolled learners

This lesson opens with Real USD (USDR), October 2023.

What happened
USDR was a dollar stablecoin whose reserves were a mix: a tranche of liquid stablecoins like DAI, a larger tranche of tokenized real estate (78 percent of the backing, as CoinDesk reported it), and some of the project's own TNGBL token. On paper it was over-backed: counting TNGBL, its collateral came to about 102 percent of the tokens outstanding. On 11 October 2023 a wave of redemptions drained the liquid tranche, the 11.8 million dollars of DAI it held the day before, and once the DAI was gone the only liquid asset left was a roughly 6.2 million dollar insurance fund against about 45 million tokens. The rest was real estate, which cannot be sold in an afternoon to pay a redeemer. With no liquid reserve left to honor redemptions, the price broke, falling from a dollar to nearly 0.51 within hours, and holders who needed out took the loss. The issuer said its focus was to make holders whole by selling off the assets, a redemption CoinDesk reported could take months, but the run had already repriced the token. The reserves were real and, on paper, sufficient in total; they were not liquid enough to meet a run, and that distinction is the whole lesson.
The decision point
A stablecoin's peg is defended by redemption, and redemption in a run is paid out of the reserves that can actually be turned into dollars right now, not out of the total reserve figure on the attestation. USDR is the case that separates the two: it was over-backed in total and still broke, because its backing was mostly real estate that could not be sold fast enough, so when redemptions surged the small liquid tranche emptied and there was nothing left to pay the next redeemer at par. The size of run a stablecoin can survive is set by its liquid reserves, the cash and cash-equivalents redeemable on demand, not by the headline number that includes illiquid assets. So the decision when judging a stablecoin's reserves is to look past the total to the liquidity: what fraction can meet redemption immediately, how fast the rest can be converted, and therefore how large a redemption wave the coin can absorb before the liquid tranche is gone. A reserve that is sufficient but illiquid is a reserve that is there in an audit and absent in a run, which is exactly the position USDR holders found themselves in.
Recorded loss
$45,000,000

What you will be able to answer

  • →Why did USDR depeg despite being over-backed?
  • →In a run, redemption is met from what?
  • →What sets the size of run a stablecoin can survive?
  • →How should stablecoin reserves be judged?

Orientation and Year One are open: anyone can read them without an account. From Year Two onward the lessons are for enrolled learners, because progress through the later years only means anything if it is tracked against a record.

It is free. We do not sell the list and there is nothing to buy at the end of it.

Terms used here

Sources and review

Confidence medium·Volatility medium·Reviewed 2026-09-16·Owner unassigned

Contested

The roughly 45 million dollar figure is USDR's circulating supply at par, the size of the coin affected, not a counted loss. CoinDesk puts the depeg low at nearly 0.51; The Block reports a fall of about 50 percent. How much holders eventually recovered from the planned asset sale is not reported in these sources, so the lesson states no recovery figure. The lesson turns on the liquidity-versus-total distinction, which holds across the reported figures.

USDR also held a portion of its own ecosystem token, TNGBL, which complicated the backing: The Block reports a collateral ratio of 102 percent counting TNGBL and an undercollateralized coin without it, and CoinDesk reports TNGBL had too little market depth to sell in size. The over-backing was on paper; the lesson uses the clean liquid-versus-illiquid point, which the real-estate tranche illustrates on its own.